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Elite directors, London finance, and
British overseas expansion: Victorian
railway networks, 1860–1900†
By SHIMA AMINI and STEVEN TOMS∗
This article considers how international economic expansion impacts on the
composition of elite groups on boards of companies. We examine, why, at the
height of the British Empire, boards of national, imperial, and international railway
companies, financed from London, were dominated by elites drawn differentially
from the aristocracy, the military, finance, and politics. To investigate the reasons
for these differences, we conduct a social network analysis of railway company
boards in three countries during the second half of the nineteenth century. Results
reveal that aristocratic directors were dominant in Britain, military directors in India,
and financier directors in Argentina, suggesting that their influence drew on local
knowledge, resource access, and network connections. They did not serve on boards
for merely ornamental purposes.
T he role of the British elite in the expansion of the international economybefore 1914 has attracted significant research interest.1 Several reasons for the
prominence of elite groups on company boards have been suggested, including
accessing finance, and enhancing the value of businesses on capital markets. 2
Empirical results are mixed, with some suggestion that aristocrats, in particular,
performed only an ‘ornamental’ function to attract investors to otherwise low-
quality issues, without full participation in their firms’ administration.3 In this
article, we examine whether the presence of elite directors reflected the expertise
required by the international location of investment, including their ability to
access resources, such as connections to human, social, and financial capital, and
their ability to influence governments through political access and lobbying. If the
evidence supports this view, it calls into question the emphasis in the prior literature
on the selection of elite directors mostly for the purposes of signalling the quality
of new issues and their otherwise marginal contribution to the management and
value of their firms.
∗Authors’ Affiliation: Leeds University Business School.
† We would like to thank Terry Gourvish and participants at a seminar held at Leeds University Business School
for helpful comments on an earlier version.
1 Cain and Hopkins, British imperialism; Chandler, Scale and scope.
2 Amini and Toms, ‘Accessing capital markets’; Braggion and Moore, ‘Economic benefits’; Franks, Mayer,
and Rossi, ‘Ownership’; Rutterford, Sotiropoulos, and van Lieshout, ‘Individual investors’; Fjesme, Galpin, and
Moore, ‘British IPO directors, 1891–1911’.
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To do this, we contrast elite board membership in railway companies, financed
by the City of London, across different international locations. Britain was a
dominant investor in many railway networks as they developed internationally,
particularly after 1870.4 The literature shows clearly that strongly contrasting
circumstances and priorities influenced the establishment of overseas railways.
Governments, and their institutional configuration in different countries, impacted
on the construction of railways and their managerial control.5 These differed
between Britain and the British Empire, Britain and third countries, and the
British Empire and third countries. To reflect these contrasts, the article uses
social network analysis to identify dominant types of elite directors of companies
listed on the London Stock Exchange (LSE), for British, British Empire, and
international railway companies. We use India and Argentina as examples of the
latter two categories.Using a dataset of individual directors serving on the boards of
railway companies with lines in Britain, India, and Argentina, we demonstrate that
the circumstances of domestic, imperial, and international economic expansion
significantly mediated firms’ board and governance characteristics.
In the modern corporate governance literature, directors demonstrate role
legitimacy through holding positions consonant with their backgrounds and
resource legitimacy to signal the firm’s access to social, human, and investment
capital through board member affiliations.6 In our analysis, role legitimacy
promotes political influence through effective lobbying, and resource legitimacy
facilitates access to financial, specialist human capital, and land resources.
Network connections underpin role and resource functions, such that interlocking
directorates facilitate the acquisition of resources and political influence and the
dissemination of information and innovation, reduce coordination costs, and reveal
information about the agendas of other firms.7 These functions indicate reasons
why particular companies might recruit specific categories of elite directors to their
boards. British economic expansion in the nineteenth century provides a useful
contextual testing ground for these relationships as a contribution to the corporate
governance literature, given the heterogeneity of elites and their greater categorical
distinctiveness, compared to more recent datasets.8 We examine these rationales
of director selection, adding to the literature on elites and British international
expansion by offering new empirical evidence on the LSE and the development of
British and international rail infrastructure.
The remainder of the article is structured as follows. The next section justifies
the selection of the three country-level case studies and reviews the relevant prior
literature on the development of railways and the role of elites. Section II describes
the methods used to construct the dataset and conduct social network analysis to
identify dominant individuals and groups in each country. Sections III to V consider
the evidence for Britain, India, and Argentina in more detail. Section VI concludes.
4 Roth and Dinhobl, eds., Across the borders.
5 Dobbin, Forging industrial policy, p. 163.
6 Hillman and Dalziel, ‘Boards of directors’; Higgins and Gulati, ‘Stacking the deck’.
7 Boeker and Goodstein, ‘Organizational performance’; Hillman and Dalziel, ‘Boards of directors’.
8 According to data accessed via Creditsafe (accessed June 2019; we are grateful to Prof. Nick Wilson of the
University of Leeds for access to this database) featuring directors of all present-day Companies House registered
companies, < 1% had readily identified elite titles.
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I. Railway development and elites in Britain, India, and Argentina
Britain, India, and Argentina are selected as country-level case studies because the
histories of their railway networks point to differing reasons for elite involvement
at board level. Each is considered briefly in turn.
British institutions stressed individual sovereignty accountable to Parliament,
rather than centralized state-backed finance. State policy was to empower
entrepreneurs, trusting that the most profitable routes would also be the most
rational.9 As landowners with significant political influence, aristocrats at first
presented an obstacle to the development of the domestic railway network.10
However, by the mid-nineteenth century, as measurement replaced social capital
based on trust, they had become substantial investors in rail firms and, as such,
enablers of the network and further industrialization.11 Directors were typically
part-time and selected for their ability to negotiate the interests of the railway, as
aristocrats influential in county administration or politicians wishing to promote
prosperity in their constituencies, and as promoters of financial, shipping, and
transport interests.12 Landowners were recruited to railway boards to promote such
interests without becoming involved in railway management technicalities. Some
board members had engineering and managerial backgrounds, albeit recruited
from elite educational institutions, and were frequently knighted once promoted
to the board.13 Chairmen emerged from upper-middle- and upper-class origins,
underpinning an ‘aristocracy of big business’.14 Lawson noted a well-defined gap
between the directorate and the executive.15
Elite dominance thus had a mostly amateurish character. The British model
was unique, and, by the late nineteenth century, poorly managed and financially
unsuccessful, and not even replicated to any significant degree in the Empire.16 It
therefore serves as a basis for comparison with railway networks that were financed
from London but constructed overseas and administered with substantial British
influence.
In India, railways reflected strategic considerations and British military security
had an essential influence on railway construction.17 Such pressures, exercised
through state power, skewed the development of the network,18 although finance
was substantially private, raised via the LSE. To encourage private British
investment, the government of India agreed to financial obligations, devolved upon
the taxpayers of India, not those of the UK. The government of India would
contribute each year to each railway that failed to earn 5 per cent of the capital
invested, to allow the payment of an equivalent dividend.19 These guarantees
helped overcome information asymmetry for overseas investors.20 Towards the end
9 Dobbin, Forging industrial policy, p. 166.
10 Casson, Railway system, p. 20.
11 Allen, ‘Theory’; Biddle, ‘Landowners’; Beckett, ‘Aristocratic contribution’.
12 Channon, ‘Recruitment’.
13 Gourvish, ‘British business elite’, p. 309, identifies 31 conferred over a 70-year period.
14 Perkin, Age of the railway, p. 172.
15 Lawson, British railways, pp. 218–19.
16 Mitchell, Chambers, and Crafts, ‘Profitability’; Lawson, British railways, p. 226.
17 Cain and Hopkins, British imperialism, p. 291.
18 Kerr, Engines of change, p. 13.
19 Thorner, ‘Great Britain’.
20 Eichengreen, ‘Financing infrastructure’; MacPherson, ‘Investment’, p. 18.
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of the century, British investment diminished because the Indian central or state
governments took back ownership as concessions expired, typically after 25 years.21
In contrast to India, Argentina provides an overseas example of substantial
British involvement, but outside the formal Empire. Argentina was the most
important country in terms of investment, with its railways dominantly owned by
foreign, and specifically British, capital.22 Recognizing the need to attract foreign
capital, like in India, Argentine governments guaranteed returns to investors.
Their concession policy assured investor profits of 7 per cent.23 Actual profits
proved excessive, leading to speculation and the Barings crash of 1890, which
did not prevent subsequent booms in railway building.24 Significant bond issues
underpinned the increase in British capital invested in Argentine rail during the
years 1892–1900. The Argentinian model was emulated elsewhere in Central and
South America, and by 1899, London accounted for 70 per cent of mileage under
operation in Latin American railways as a whole.25
The three countries thus developed their railway networks according to differing
economic rationales. The structure of land ownership, nascent manufacturing
zones, and infrastructure were important in Britain. In India, priorities were
determined by the military security of an imperial strategic market. In Argentina,
financial interests required negotiation with local political interests to secure
concessions to support commodity export trade and manage associated risk.
These differences suggest alternative justifications for appointing elite directors
to the boards of railway companies, offering explanations of board composition
that complement alternative hypotheses derived from financial theories based on
agency, signalling, and market access.
II. Measuring elite network dominance
To investigate dominant elite groups, we obtained the names of all directors for
all LSE quoted mainline railway companies with operations in Britain, India, and
Argentina.We selected quoted railway companies from the December issues of the
Investor’s MonthlyManual (hereafter the IMM) and board membership details from
Bradshaw’s General Railway Directory, Shareholders’ Guide, Manual and Almanack
(hereafter Bradshaw’s).We also collected data on bankers, solicitors, engineers, and
brokers for each company.
To conduct a comparative analysis of the elite composition of boards, we used
two census dates, 1869 and 1895. Because network construction in India and
Argentina began later than in the UK, 1869 represents the earliest date for practical
comparison of boards’ elite composition across the three countries. We used
four elite types, based on their prominence in the literature on elites: aristocrat,
politician, military, and financier.26 We use a broad definition of ‘aristocrat’
21 Corley, ‘Britain’s overseas investments’, p. 85.
22 Duncan, ‘British railways’.
23 Ferns, ‘Investment and trade’.
24 Cain and Hopkins, British imperialism, p. 259.
25 Ferns, ‘Investment and trade’; Bignon, Esteves, and Herranz-Loncán, ‘Big push’, p. 1283.
26 Defined respectively according to the peerage and conferred titles, senior military rank designation,Member of
Parliament, director of bank or financial service company. Recent papers have considered aristocrats/peers and/or
MPs (Burhop et al., ‘Regulating IPOs’; Braggion and Moore, ‘Economic benefits’; Campbell and Turner, ‘Legal
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inclusive of landed gentry and promoted knights in line with Weber, who noted
shared economic attitudes, and Cain and Hopkins, who argue that gentlemen are
made as well as born in a constant evolutionary process.27 In similar vein, Acheson
et al. note that the ‘landed gentry… made up the second tier of the aristocracy’
and continued to signal elite status in the second half of the nineteenth century.28
To examine the gentlemanly capitalism hypothesis in its international context, our
inclusive definition allows us to document promotion to elite status, including in
India, where a new ‘aristocracy’ was created.Our approach contrasts with narrower
definitions in other studies of elite boards,whose purpose is tomeasure preordained
political influence exercised through the House of Lords.29
We also collected data for other context-specific designations indicative of
influential roles, but which fall outside elite categorization: lawyers, engineers,
merchants, industrialists, and government officials. Annual volumes of Bradshaw’s
were used to identify directors and the individuals or firms performing advisory
functions, and the period for which railway directorships were held.30
To assign individuals to elite sub-groups at each census date, we obtained
information from biographical and newspaper sources.31 Directors identified as
aristocrats were classified according to their inheritance, date of conferment, and
appearance at the two census dates.32 Aristocrats with inherited titles were classified
as aristocrats regardless of a subsequent business, political, or military career.
Promoted aristocrats were classified according to status at the census date. Where
knighthoods and honours were conferred before the census date, the individual
was classified as an aristocrat. For directors who served as politicians, relevant
dates were established or confirmed using election results data.33 Where there were
career changes—for example, when a financier became a politician—we assigned
the primary role according to the census date and noted the secondary career role.
Sensitivity analysis was conducted by swapping the primary role into the secondary
role.
Comparative cross-sectional analysis based on the two census dates facilitates
our methodology, which is to conduct a social network analysis of elite directors,
quantifying the dominance of elite groups and individuals within them. Social
network analysis characterizes networked structures in terms of nodes and
ties (edges). Networks can be conceptualized organizationally, as networks of
firms connected by directors, or as an intra-class phenomenon, as networks of
protection’; Grossman and Imai, ‘Taking the lord’s name’) and political and military directors (Fjesme, Galpin,
and Moore, ‘Efficient market’).
27 Weber, Economy and society, p. 307; Cain and Hopkins, British imperialism, p. 38.
28 Acheson, Campbell, and Turner, ‘Expansion’, p. 613.
29 Burhop et al., ‘Regulating IPOs’; Braggion and Moore, ‘Economic benefits’; Grossman and Imai, ‘Taking the
lord’s name’.
30 National Railway Museum, York archive, RSM/10-61, Bradshaw’s Railway Manual, Shareholders’ Guide and
Official Directory (London: Henry Blacklock & Co.).
31 Oxford dictionary of national biography, https://www.oxforddnb.com/ (accessed June 2020); Jeremy and Shaw,
eds., Dictionary of business biography; Grace’s guide to British industrial history, https://www.gracesguide.co.uk
(accessed June 2020). Newspaper obituaries, sourced from British Library newspapers, parts I–V, hosted by Gale
Primary Sources, https://www.gale.com/intl/primary-sources(accessed June 2020).
32 Debrett, Debrett’s illustrated peerage; Cokayne, Complete peerage.
33 Craig, ed.,British parliamentary election results, 1832–1885; idem, ed.,British parliamentary election results, 1885–
1918.
© 2020 The Authors. The Economic History Review published by John Wiley & Sons
Ltd on behalf of Economic History Society.
Economic History Review, 0, 0 (2020)



















Figure 1. Diagrammatic illustration of our network construction
[Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
Notes:Circles 1–5 represent companies. D1–D14 represent directors.
individuals connected by firms.34 We emphasize the latter to highlight the roles
of elite individuals and their connections. Network parameters are set as directors
of sample railway companies at each census date and the following advisory
roles: brokers, solicitors, bankers, and consulting engineers. These roles measure
directors’ ability to use their network influence by performing brokerage functions35
to fill gaps in networks and potentially attract financial resources, as well as
financial, legal, and technical expertise.
The example in figure 1 illustrates our network construction. There are five
companies (circles 1–5) and 14 directors (D1–D14). D1 sits on the board of three
companies (1, 3, and 4). D2 sits on the board of two companies (1 and 2). All other
directors sit on the board of just one company. If two directors are on the board of
the same company then they are directly connected (for example, D1 and D2).
Degree centrality is the number of direct connections a director has within the
network and measures network influence. It proxies individuals’ ability to access
and share knowledge and other resources and thereby influence the wider network.
For example, node D1 has a degree of 5 as it is connected directly to five other
directors (D2, D3, D4, D7, and D8) and node D3 has a degree of 3 as it is directly
connected to three other directors.
The degree centrality measure does not necessarily reflect the positional
advantage of a node in the network, as the number of direct connections may
34 Burris and Staples, ‘Search’.
35 Burt, Brokerage.
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not accurately reflect a director’s ability to control information and resource flow
and to coordinate otherwise disparate parts of the network. For example, D1 and
D9 both have a degree of 5. However, D1 has a better informational advantage
associated with network position, acting as a bridge between more directors via
indirect connections. For example, D4 and D8 are indirectly connected via D1.
The number of indirect connections between two nodes is a path. For example,
the path between D6 and D7 has three connections: D6–D2,D2–D1, and D1–D7.
Betweenness centrality measures the number of times a node lies on the shortest
path between other nodes. It highlights nodes acting as ‘bridges’ in a network,
proxying for a director’s ability to control information and resource flow and to
coordinate otherwise disparate parts of the network. The betweenness measure for
D9 is less than the betweenness measure for D1. D9 never lies on the shortest path
between other nodes (its betweenness is 0), whereas D1 lies on the shortest path
between other nodes 11 times (for example, in the shortest path between D3 and
D7 or between D2 and D8).
Degree and betweenness centrality are calculated for all the directors in each of
the railway networks (574 directors) to identify significant individuals within each
network.36 These results inform our later discussion in sections II, III, and IV,where
we discuss each railway network separately focusing on significant individuals in
each network.
Before considering individual directors, we begin our analysis by examining the
aggregated features of the six networks.37 First, we measure the overall network
centrality using Freeman degree centrality, which describes cohesion around
particular focal points. It shows the variation between the degree centrality scores
among the nodes. It is defined, for a given network with nodes v1….vn and
maximum degree centrality cmax, as (cmax - c(vi))/((n-1)(n-2)), where c(vi) is the
degree centrality of node vi. In our example, maximum degree centrality between
directors (cmax) is 5. The degree centrality measures for directors 1 to 14 (c(vi)) are
5, 5, 3, 3, 2, 2, 1, 1, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5 respectively, and n is equal to 14. Therefore, the
Freeman degree centrality of the network in this example is 0.115.
Second, we consider density, which describes the general level of cohesion in
a network, defined as the number of connections divided by the total number of
possible connections.38 In the example, the total number of possible connections
between the 14 directors is the number of ways to choose two directors among the
14 directors (the number of two-combinations out of 14) and is equal to 91. The
number of actual connections in the network is 26, and therefore the density of the
network is 26/91 (0.286).
Third, we measure average geodesic distance, which is the average distance
between pairs of nodes in the network. Geodesic distance is defined as the number
of connections between two nodes in the shortest path connecting them. Average
geodesic distance is the average distance between pairs of nodes in the network. It
36 Given the large number of directors in this study (574), individual degree and betweenness measures are not
tabulated.
37 All measures were calculated using the UCINET program and definitions, http://www.analytictech.com/
ucinet/help/3ava_zr.htm (accessed on 13 Feb. 2019). See also Scott, ‘Social network analysis’, pp. 113–15;
Freeman, ‘Centrality’.
38 We exclude possible indirect linkages between directors, for example, via financial and industrial companies,
and their boards due to data restrictions. Network densities are therefore lower-bound estimates.
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Table 1. Railway director summary statistics
Total elite
Year Total director Total elite Aristocrat Military Politician Financier
1869 Britain 192 114 25.43 12.28 29.82 32.45
India 54 33 12.12 33.33 30.30 24.24
Argentina 23 10 10.00 10.00 50.00 30.00
1895 Britain 170 113 56.63 10.61 21.23 11.50
India 76 59 23.72 47.46 8.47 20.33
Argentina 59 40 20.00 10.00 17.5 52.50
Totals (%) 32.52 18.97 23.03 25.47
Totals (N) 574 369 120 70 85 94
Note:The share of directors in each category of elite sums to 100% because each is exclusively allocated first categorization used
in the analysis here.
Sources:Quoted railway companies identified from IMM and individual directors from Bradshaw’s.
therefore measures small-world effects in networks, that is, the ease with which one
part of the network influences another. In our example, we have 26 paths with 1
connection between directors (for example, the path between D1 and D2, or the
path betweenD13 andD14),we have 13 paths with 2 connections (for example, the
shortest path between D1 and D5 consists of 2 connections: D1–D2 and D2–D5),
and we have 4 paths with 3 connections (for example, the shortest path between D6
and D7 has three connections: D6–D2, D2–D1, D1–D7). Therefore, the average
geodesic distance in our example is 1.488.
Finally, the group exchange score was used to measure dominance according
to the relative importance and connectivity characteristics of elite sub-groups. It
is defined as the number of reciprocal ties connected to one group (aristocrat,
military, politician, financier, and so on) divided by the total number of reciprocal
ties in the network.39 The rationale behind the group exchange analysis is that
dominant groups consist of individuals with more connections to the rest of the
network. We are thus able to show how groups exercised their dominance. In the
example, suppose that D1, D2, D10, and D12 are aristocrats and D6, D7, and D8
are engineers. The total number of connections that aristocrats (D1, D2, D10, and
D12) have is 20 (5+5+5+5). The total number of connections that engineers (D6,
D7, and D8) have is 4 (2+1+1). Finally, the total number of existing connections
in the network is 26. Therefore, the group exchange measure for the aristocrats is
20/26 (0.769) and the group exchange measure for the engineers is 4/26 (0.154),
suggesting that aristocrats are more dominant than engineers.
Table 1 shows the size of each network according to the number of individual
directors, grouped by elite category. The data provide indicative support for our
central hypothesis of differential reasons for appointing elite directors according
to local circumstances of economic expansion. Of the 574 individuals identified,
64.29 per cent fell into one of the four elite categories. Aristocrats were the largest
sub-group, and most conspicuous in British railway companies. Directors with
military designations were most prominent in India. Politicians and financiers
were more pronounced in Argentina than elsewhere, although the former group
39 Fliervoet, Geerling, Mostert, and Smits, ‘Analyzing’.
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Table 2. Characteristics of railway companies with hereditary vs. promoted aristocrats




















1869 Britain 19 10 12.73 13.07 340.11 470.16 14.26 14.45
India 2 2 6.50 7.25 209.00 521.75 13.00 9.50
Argentina 1 0 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
1895 Britain 50 14 12.68 13.46 749.22 1,192.28 39.11 38.00
India 10 4 6.15 6.95 451.83 586.33 33.25 14.33
Argentina 6 2 6.16 6.50 283.00 477.50 14.00 7.00
Aggregate
results
88 32 11.36 11.71 613.98 822.70 31.44 24.39
Sources:As for tab. 1.
was less significant in the mature phase, whereas the latter group became more
so. Including bankers, solicitors, brokers, and consulting engineers increased the
number of network nodes from 574 to 842. In the analysis that follows, we
report the characteristics of the larger network only and note any differences as
appropriate.40
To analyse the aristocrat group further in all three countries, we distinguished
between hereditary and promoted aristocrats and compared the size of the boards
on which they served, the age of the firm, and the mileage of the controlled
network. Table 2 shows the results. As of 1869, hereditary aristocrats were also
most prominent in the UK, and there was a much larger increase in UK hereditary
aristocrats relative to promoted aristocrats between 1869 and 1895. Directors with
inherited titles were relatively prominent in India by 1895, but more so in absolute
and relative terms in the UK in 1895. Board size did not influence the appointment
of either category, but hereditary aristocrats predominated in firms that controlled
smaller networks (in terms of mileage) in all three locations in 1869 and 1895. Firm
age had no impact, except that hereditary aristocrats were more prevalent in older
firms in India. The evidence suggests that particular types of aristocrat were not
selected according to the maturity of the firm nor for purely ornamental reasons,
but that promotion to the aristocracy was more likely where the firm controlled a
larger rail network and for directors serving on the boards of newer firms in India.
Table 3 shows comparatives for 1869 and 1895 for each of the three aggregate
network measures defined above. Over both census dates, Britain had the lowest
density and degree of centrality. Argentina had the highest density and India the
highest degree of centrality. These characteristic rankings persist, and are the same
in 1869 and 1895. In 1869 Britain had the largest geodesic distance and Argentina
the smallest.These differences reflect the relative scale of the networks.By 1895, the
British network had evolved into more separated clusters of regionally concentrated
networks, whereas India and Argentina, in particular, had more interconnected but
distant clusters, reflected in their higher geodesic distances.
40 Other functionaries, such as company secretaries and auditors, whose role was of a more routine administrative
nature, were excluded.
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1869 Britain 256 0.064 0.164 2.7
India 96 0.142 0.669 2.0
Argentina 32 0.413 0.378 1.7
1895 Britain 226 0.066 0.144 1.7
India 133 0.102 0.307 2.4
Argentina 99 0.110 0.190 3.7
Total 842
Average 140.333 0.149 0.309 2.3
Notes:Density of a network is the no. of connections in the network divided by the no. of possible connections, that is, (degree
centrality)/n(n-1). Freeman degree centrality in a network is defined, for a given binary network with vertices v1….vn andmaximum
degree centrality cmax, as (cmax - c(vi))/((n-1)(n-2)), where c(vi) is the degree centrality of vertex vi. Geodesic distance is defined
as the no. of connections edges between two nodes in the shortest path connecting them.
Sources:As for tab. 1.
Table 4. Dominant groups
Dominant groups(Group exchange score)
Year
Country of





































Notes: The table reports group exchange scores to identify dominance at the level of sub-group for each network. The group
exchange score is defined as the no. of reciprocal ties connected to one group divided by the total no. of reciprocal ties in the
network.
Sources:As for tab. 1.
Figure 2 maps all connections formed from the sample companies in each
network and confirms the above pattern. To ascertain individual directors’
influence, as opposed to firms or other individuals, directors are indicated as shaded
squares, railway companies as triangles, and all other nodes as circles. The British
network diagrams (panels A and D) are characterized by highly centralized but
relatively independent clusters, whereas in India (panels B and E) clusters are
less discernible, and connectivity is more evenly distributed across the network. In
Argentina (panels C and F) the clusters are more decentralized and interconnected.
Figure 2 and tables 1 and 3 show the distribution of network actors, but further
analysis is needed to quantify the nature of the power and influence of each group
and associated individuals using the group exchange measure. Table 4 presents the
© 2020 The Authors. The Economic History Review published by John Wiley & Sons
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Figure 2. Railway network diagrams
[Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
Note: Shaded squares indicate nodes representing individual directors; triangles indicate railway companies; all other nodes are
circles.
Sources:As for tab. 1.
results. The group exchange scores in table 4 reveal the dominant group in each
network, and figure 2 shows how the influence of the dominant groupwas exercised.
In Britain, a coalition of aristocrats and politicians, along with industrialists,
controlled regionally concentrated but otherwise disconnected networks of
influence. In India, the military was dominant in an interconnected network and
projected their influence, along with Indian government officials. In Argentina,
politicians and financiers dominated, along with engineers and lawyers. Some
changes through time are also observable. Aristocrats were much more influential
in all three networks in 1895 relative to 1869. In India, the military retained
© 2020 The Authors. The Economic History Review published by John Wiley & Sons
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Figure 2. Continued
its dominance, but politicians and government officials lost some of their earlier
influence. In Argentina, financiers overtook politicians as the dominant group at
the later census date.41 We do not have data on shareholdings of railway firms
country by country. However, aggregate data for 1883–1907 show that the order
of preference for aristocratic investors was Empire firms first, UK firms second,
and foreign firms third. Investors with military backgrounds preferred UK, then
41 A sensitivity analysis, excluding promoted aristocrats and non-director nodes, produced the same group
exchange rankings for Britain and Argentina in all permutations, and for India, where the importance of aristocrats
was sensitive to the exclusion of promoted aristocrats.
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Figure 2. Continued
Empire, then foreign. Financiers preferred foreign, then UK, then Empire.42 The
trends in the aggregate data suggest that directorships in table 4 mirrored the
investment preferences of that section of the elite to some degree.
We examine these relationships further using exact logistic regression analysis to
predict the likelihood of elite directors sitting on the board of railways in Britain,
India, or Argentina (table 5). The exact logistic regression uses a logistic function
42 Davis and Gallman, Evolving financial markets, p. 205, tab. 2.4–7; Rutterford, ‘Merchant banker’; Acheson
et al., ‘Expansion’, p. 608.
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Panel A: Exact logistic regression results for 1869 census year
Aristocrat 2.514 0.580 0.232 0.398∗
Military 0.511 3.146∗∗ 0.307 1.956
Politician 0.988 1.110 0.866 1.012
Financier 1.463 0.867 0.510 0.684
N 269 269 269 269
Chi-square 8.303∗ 8.773∗ 4.438 8.303∗
Panel B: Exact logistic regression results for 1895 census year
Aristocrat 1.831∗ 0.870 0.401∗∗ 0.546∗
Military 0.239∗∗∗ 7.677∗∗∗ 0.392 4.176∗∗∗
Politician 1.261 0.723 0.941 0.793
Financier 0.251∗∗∗ 1.572 3.241∗∗∗ 3.977∗∗∗
N 305 305 305 305
Chi-square 44.677∗∗∗ 38.098∗∗∗ 26.517∗∗∗ 44.677∗∗∗
Panel C: Exact logistic regression results for 1869 and 1895 census years combined
Aristocrat 1.783∗∗ 0.776 0.439∗∗ 0.561∗∗
Military 0.308∗∗∗ 5.486∗∗∗ 0.417∗ 3.249∗∗∗
Politician 1.113 0.942 0.889 0.898
Financier 0.590∗∗ 1.187 1.849∗ 1.694∗∗
N 574 574 574 574
Chi-square 36.343∗∗∗ 43.496∗∗∗ 17.259 36.343∗∗∗
Notes:The table reports odds ratio for exact logistic regressions. Dependent variable in col. 1 is a 1/0 dummy variable indicating
whether a director sits on the board of a railway company in Britain.Dependent variable in col. 2 is a 1/0 dummy variable indicating
whether a director sits on the board of a railway company in India. Dependent variable in col. 3 is a 1/0 dummy variable indicating
whether a director sits on the board of a railway company in Argentina. Independent variables are 1/0 dummies indicating whether
the director is in each elite category.
∗∗∗
Significant at the p < 0.01 level.
∗∗
Significant at the p < 0.05 level.
∗
Significant at the p
< 0.1 level.
Sources:As for tab. 1.
to model binary dependent and independent variables and is more appropriate for
smaller samples,43 specifying the dependency of π (the probability that the binary
response variable, Y, takes the value of 1) on x in the relationship:
log (π/1 − π ) = β0 + β1x1 + β2x2 + · · · + βnxn (1)
where π = Pr (Y = 1|x) is the response probability to be modelled (with Y being
a binary response variable), β is the vector of unknown regression parameters, and
X is a vector of binary explanatory variables. Therefore, the likelihood function, or
probability of the response is:44
π = Pr (y = 1|x) = {1 + exp(− (β0 + β1x1 + β2x2 + · · · + βnxn)}−1 (2)
To facilitate interpretation of the regression coefficients they are conventionally
converted to the odds ratio, which is the exponential of the coefficient.
43 Mehta and Patel, ‘Exact logistic regression’.
44 Hirji, Mehta, and Patel, ‘Computing’.
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In table 5, the odds ratios are mostly confirmatory of the pattern in table 4.
In 1869 aristocrats were the elite group most likely to obtain a directorship of
an overseas railway, but by 1895 overseas directors were much more likely to be
drawn from military and financier groups, reflecting respective dominance in India
and Argentina (column 4). Directors with military titles were 7.677 times more
likely to feature on the boards of Indian railways. Aristocratic and military directors
were less likely to appear on the boards of Argentinian railways, but financiers were
3.241 times more likely to do so. Overall aristocrats were more likely to feature on
British railway boards, military directors on Indian railway boards, and financiers
on Argentinian railway boards.
The analysis confirms significant differences in network characteristics, but
also path dependencies, which also potentially explains why different elite groups
appeared on prospectuses when British and overseas railway companies were
floated on the LSE. The next three sections use further empirical evidence to
explain how key individuals and institutions dominated their respective networks,
thereby offering a more detailed explanation of the trends revealed by the social
network analysis. Individuals are selected for further investigation on the basis of
their influence in each network, measured according to betweenness score. Each
country, Britain, India, and Argentina, is examined in turn.
III. Britain
The British network in 1869 was characterized by low density and low centrality
(table 3). The clustering apparent in figure 2, panel A, reflects the association of
directors on the boards of British railway firms in the early phase of development,
with relatively few interlocks. Politicians were themost significant of the elite groups
on the boards of regionally consolidated lines. Competition between networks of
railway companies explains the separated pattern of regional networks that were
centralized within those regions (figure 2, panel A). Financiers were significant
networkers as a collective group (table 4), but there were no outstandingly well-
connected individuals. Financiers were also important and industrialists were the
most dominant non-elite group (tables 1 and 4).
Most prominent, in terms of network influence, were politicians Charles Henry
Turner and Sir William Edward Watkin. The separated clusters of railway firms
in figure 2 (panel A) were joined in only a few cases by directors with high
betweenness scores, and Watkin and Turner were the leading examples.45 Turner
was MP for Liverpool and subsequently South Lancashire. In 1869, he was a
director of the London, Tilbury and Southend Railway Company; the Manchester,
Sheffield and Lincolnshire Railway Company (MSLR); the Great Eastern Railway
Company; and the Great Northern Railway Company (GNR).46 As a Liverpool
merchant of 35 years’ experience and former chairman of the Mersey Docks
and Harbour Board, Turner championed the expansion of the network from
Liverpool in Parliament. Rapid growth led the Liverpool business community
45 Betweenness scores for Turner andWatkin were 2,523.58 and 1,759.43 respectively. The only other individual
with a comparable score (=1,630.25) was politician Charles Gilpin (1815–75), who served on the boards of the
South Eastern, Metropolitan, and Metropolitan District railways.
46 Turner was also a director of the Tottenham and Hampstead Junction railway; Bradshaws, 1869.
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to advocate a second Liverpool–Manchester line, promoted by the MSLR and
GNR in partnership with the Midland. Crucial for Turner was the avoidance of
restrictions and priorities from the already functioning London and NorthWestern
Railway Company, on which the MSLR and GNR both depended. As an MP
and director, Turner provided role-based legitimacy to arguments in favour of the
railway. The MSLR board deployed technical experts to marshal the facts, which
opponents argued were specious, involving fabricated evidence. Nonetheless with
Turner’s assistance, they were sufficient to ‘make a parliamentary case’.47
The only other prominent individual was Watkin, a promoted aristocrat, and
widely acknowledged in the literature.48 A notable feature of the present analysis,
however, is how, like Turner, but unlike most other contemporary railway directors,
Watkin interlocked through multiple directorships. Their positions reflected
regional interests but also spanned regions by virtue of the interlocks. Moreover,
Watkin interlocked with several boards that also featuredTurner: theGreat Eastern,
the MSLR, the Great Western and South Eastern Railway Companies. Watkin
also served north-western and south-eastern constituencies and, as a Cheshire
MP and later high sheriff of Cheshire, was instrumental in the development of
the Liverpool–Manchester connection, alongside Turner in negotiations that finally
resulted in the second line in 1877.49
Although Watkin had achieved aristocratic status by 1869, he was from
relatively humble origins and reflected the priorities of industrialists. As Turner
represented the Liverpool interest, so Watkin had associations with Manchester-
centred industrialists influential in the development of the early northern network.
Industrialists were influential by simultaneously being railway directors and
politicians themselves, for example, William Henry Hornby, Conservative MP and
cotton industrialist with interests in Blackburn and Manchester, who served as
a director of the Lancashire and Yorkshire Railway,50 or through connections to
other directors who were politicians. Links to individuals like Watkin facilitated the
expansion of the railway network to their advantage, as in the case of EdwardTootal,
of the Manchester cotton firm Atkinson and Tootal. Watkin, therefore, illustrates
how powerful local industrialists were able to use the political system to facilitate
the expansion of the railway network.51
Network features remained constant in terms of centrality and density while
aristocrats became more decisively the dominant group by 1895. There were
more aristocratic directors, but politicians and total elite had diminished and so
too had industrialists (table 1). Gourvish notes that the boards of most mainline
companies featured knighted executives, but not until after 1890.52 Our data show
that whereas promoted aristocrats were more significant numerically, rising from
10 to 14, they were relatively less important compared to hereditary aristocrats.
Promoted aristocrats accounted for 34.5 per cent of aristocrats in 1869, falling to
47 Manchester Sheffield and Lincolnshire Railway (extension,&c) Bill (P.P. 1865, CXX), ev. Turner, pp. 29–31.
48 Gourvish, ‘Performance’.
49 Watkin was knighted in 1868 for services in Canada and was not a serving MP in 1869; ‘Sir Edward William
Watkin’,Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, https://www.oxforddnb.com (accessed June 2020).
50 Hodgkins, Diary. On Hornby’s industrial and political influence, see ‘Grand Conservative demonstration’,
Blackburn Standard, 14 Sept. 1853; Bradshaw’s, 1855.
51 Hodgkins, Diary.
52 Gourvish, ‘British business elite’, pp. 308–9. For example, eight out of 19 directors on the board of the Great
Western Railway in 1895 were aristocrats; Bradshaw’s, 1895.
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21.8 per cent in 1895. Politicians remained significant, but less so compared to
1869. A possible reason is that railway construction was less politically contested
than in the 1840s, 1850s, and 1860s.53 Industrialists’ direct involvement secured
networks that could serve regional business interests, which dissipated once the
major features of the network were in place. The three main categories of dominant
elite—aristocrats, politicians, and industrialists—served on boards of one railway
only, commonly the one most closely aligned with broader business interests. The
clusters in figure 2, panel D, therefore, represent regional networks controlled by
separate elite groups of industrialists.They achieved status by winning elections and
promotion to the aristocracy, and were increasingly complemented by aristocrats
with hereditary status.
The role of interlocked directors had also diminished compared to the 1869
network. With maturity, there were fewer new projects, and thus less competition
between business groups to secure development of convenient lines. In 1895, only
a few new projects were necessary to complete what was soon to become the full
extent of the network, the most notable of which was the Great Central Railway.
The project accounted for the significant interlocks between directors, which, as in
1869, were centred on Watkin. In 1895,Watkin was the only aristocrat still present
on multiple boards. These were the Metropolitan, the South Eastern, the MSLR,
and East London Railways, fewer than in 1869, as reflected by a lower betweenness
score.54 The only other directors with non-zero betweenness scores who were also
politicians or industrialists were John James Mellor and Henry Davis Pochin.55
Mellor, a cotton industrialist by background, became an MP in 1895 when he was
also director of the South Eastern and Metropolitan railway companies. Mellor
was also Watkin’s brother-in-law,56 and they collaborated on abortive projects for
a Channel Tunnel and an Eiffel Tower-type project (planned for a site close to
the London terminals of the Metropolitan and South Eastern Railway terminals
at Cannon Street).57 Crucially, Mellor was chairman of the Ways and Means
Committee in the House of Commons, and able to influence how the proposed
expansion of the MSLR railway into London might affect the Tower Company’s
project.58
Another notable director in the Watkin network was Henry Davis Pochin,
director of the MSLR and chairman of the Metropolitan Railway. Pochin was
an industrial chemist and held directorships in several large industrial and
engineering firms: Bolckow Vaughan, John Brown & Co. Staveley Coal and Iron,
and Sheepbridge. He was also a director of the Watkin’s Tower Company.59 By
virtue of his directorships, Pochin was well placed to ensure a beneficial outcome for
both companies. The Metropolitan Railway held surplus lands in London, which
Pochin could use within his network. Some of them were let to the Tower Company
53 Alderman, Railway interest.
54 591.0 compared to 1,759.43.
55 John James Mellor = 99.60 and Henry Davis Pochin = 30.00.
56 Jackson, London’s Metropolitan Railway, p. 153.
57 ‘The Channel Tunnel’, Standard, 17 Dec. 1886; ‘Watkin’s “folly”’, Financial Times, 24 Aug. 1889; ‘Wembley
Park Tower’, Financial Times, 16 May 1896.
58 ‘Manchester, Sheffield and Lincolnshire Railway’, Sheffield Independent, 5 July 1895. Following expansion to
London, the company became the Great Central Railway in 1898; Vanns, Great Central Railway.
59 ‘Obituary’,Nottingham Evening Post, 30 Oct. 1895.
© 2020 The Authors. The Economic History Review published by John Wiley & Sons
Ltd on behalf of Economic History Society.
Economic History Review, 0, 0 (2020)
18 SHIMA AMINI AND STEVEN TOMS
and the rest were held in expectation of increases in price when the MSLR reached
London and needed sites for stations and other purposes.60
In summary, regional elites of aristocrats, politicians, and industrialists
dominated the boards of British railways in the late nineteenth century. Aristocrats
and politicians were commonly industrialists in their earlier careers. Other groups,
including lawyers and engineers, were less dominant in the British network, and
financiers declined in importance. Lawson, a contemporary observer, was thus
correct when he noted that compared to their German and American counterparts,
British firms lacked technical and scientific understanding and relied on trust,
although were otherwise secretive, resisting shareholder and legislative scrutiny.61
Also, directors formed business groups though interlocks using role legitimacy to
exercise political influence to secure network improvements favourable to their
business interests, more so in 1869 than in 1895.
IV. India
In 1869 more than 90 per cent of shareholders in major Indian railways were
British, and almost all the capital was equity. Shareholders were represented by
a board of directors in London, which included the heads of British companies
with interests in India, retired members of the British military, and members of
the British financial elite.62 The evidence in table 4 confirms that military directors
were the dominant group on the boards of Indian railway companies. Unlike the
regional clustering of director networks in the British system, connections in the
Indian network were more evenly distributed.
Individually, military directors were numerous and populated most boards
extensively, but did not typically hold multiple positions. Directorships accordingly
represented the strategic interests of the military as a collective group, rather than
through specifically influential individuals. Seven out of nine companies in 1869
featured military directors, reflecting the location of their earlier military service.
For example, Lieutenant Colonel D. Montgomerie, a retired officer of Madras,
served on the board of the Madras Railway Company. Colonel Sir F. L. Arthur,
who served in Bombay later, became a director of the Scinde Railway Company.63
Others had military engineering backgrounds; for example, Major-General C. C.
Johnston of the Oudh and Rohilkhand Railway (ORR) and Captain James Gilbert
Johnston of the Madras Engineers, subsequently director of the Great Southern
Railway of India (GSRI).64
Politicians were also prominent as a group in the early Indian network (table 4).
Significant individuals included MPs Robert Wigram Crawford and George Lyall,
who served on the board of the East Indian Railway Company (EIRC). Crawford
and Lyall combined expertise and influence as MPs with experience as merchants
60 ‘The Metropolitan Railway’, London Standard, 28 Jan. 1893.
61 Lawson, British railways, pp. 223–5.
62 Mukherjee, Early history.
63 India Office, Indian Army and Civil Service List, p. 269; Asiatic Journal and Monthly Miscellany, vol. 38, May–
Aug. 1842, p. 400.
64 Indian News and Chronicle of Eastern Affaires, 2 Jan. 1851, p. 562; Gentleman’s Magazine, vol. 31, Jan.–June
1849, p. 312. The GSRI was the main route in the Madras Presidency.
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in Bombay and the East India Company (EIC) respectively.65 As with military
directors, politicians tended to specialize in their firms rather than extending
interlocking ties across the network.66
A third influential group, with a somewhat different pattern of influence, were
government officials. A government of India representative, appointed by the
secretary of state, sat on company boards and had the authority to veto decisions.67
Juland Danvers served on the boards of seven out of eight mainline railways as
government director of Indian railway companies and secretary of the PublicWorks
Department.68 He began his career with the EIC in 1842 and became government
director in 1861, as an India Office civil servant. Based in London, he nonetheless
had by far the highest degree and betweenness centrality scores and can easily be
discerned in figure 2, panel B.69 Danvers’s influence over railway policy as a civil
servant reflected the strategic reasons for military directors dominating individual
boards. In 1877, he noted how railways were used for military control, allowing for
‘military force to be moved with ease and expedition’, to undermine the power of
local potentates, and to provide famine relief to distressed areas.70
The evolution of Indian railways between the census dates reflected competing
interests between the Indian government and London-based private investors.
Most mainline firms resolved these through contract renegotiation involving debt
cancellation, new profit-sharing arrangements based on lower rates of guarantee,
and delineation of operating responsibilities. The result was a system in which
the Indian state structure retained a dominant influence.71 The role and resource
legitimacy of the dominant military and government officials contributed to more
effective planning and control of the physical network at a lower cost.
Military influence, backed by state officials, was therefore crucial in the early
years of the network, and by 1895 this position had consolidated further. Some
influential military directors had civil service and engineering backgrounds,
such as Major-General William Spottiswoode Trevor and Lieutenant-General Sir
Edward C. S.Williams, both of the Royal Engineers.72 Lieutenant-General Craven
Hildesley Dickens was director of the AssamBengal, the Bengal andNorthWestern
(BNW), the Bengal Central, the Bengal Nagpur, Bombay and the Baroda, and
Central India railway companies. Since 1861, Dickens had been secretary to the
Government of India PublicWorks Department and involved in the construction of
railway infrastructure and irrigation works. He developed expertise in the financing
of the railway network, state involvement, and the guarantee system. In doing so,
Dickens and others distinguished between lines required for military purposes and
purely commercial lines, and the associated methods of financing. Dickens, and
others, also noted the value of the railway network in reducing the risk posed by
65 Observer, 8 Dec. 1851, p. 8 and 19 Apr. 1868, p. 2; Lyall obituary, Bankers’Magazine, 1881, vol. 41, p. 940.
66 Individual military and political directors all had relatively low degree centrality and betweenness scores.
67 Bogart and Chaudhary, ‘Regulation’.
68 The exception was the ORR where the equivalent was the EIC representative, William Dent; ‘Colonial and
foreign’, Observer, 4 Aug. 1861, p. 3; ‘Memorial notices’,Manchester Guardian, 21 Oct. 1902.
69 Betweenness score = 5,319.40.
70 Danvers, ‘Indian railways’, p. 269.
71 Kerr, Engines of change, pp. 77–8.
72 Marriott and Mukhopadhyay, Britain, p. 445; India Office, India List and India Office List, pp. 632, 647;
Bradshaw’s, 1895.
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famines.73 Such expertise was crucial, not just for state financial decisions regarding
railways, but also to identify which lines had potential for flotation on the LSE.
As table 4 shows, aristocrats had overtaken politicians as the second most
dominant group, although the discontinuity was more apparent than real. Indeed
increased aristocratic representation reflected the continued influence of Indian
state actors.Many of these directors acquired aristocratic titles, following the Indian
government’s policy of creating a class of titled individuals through a new honours
system, based around the Order of the Star of India and the Order of the Indian
Empire.74 Such honours were conferred on directors with a prior military record
or with senior administrative roles in the Indian Civil Service. For example, Robert
Barclay Chapman, Companion of the Star of India of the Bengal Civil Service and
former financial secretary to the government of India, was by 1895 a director of
the BNW.75
Government officials more generally remained the most influential non-elite
category. Frederick M. Halliday, director of the EIRC and the Barsi Light Railway,
had a career in the Bengal Civil Service.Robert Leslie Crawford, former accountant
general of the Public Works Department, Government of India, was director of one
company and accountant for another. Juland Danvers, now Sir Juland and Knight
Commander of the Star of India, remained influential, although relatively less so
compared to 1869.76
The evidence reveals a close network of significant individuals combining
military/state backgrounds. Aristocratic designations were an outcome of these
roles and conferred on most of the leading individuals in the network. Like civil
servants, military directors also gained admission to the Indian aristocracy.77 At
some point in their careers, therefore, most of the dominant individuals fell into at
least two of the military, state, or aristocratic groups, and often all three, suggesting
they were part of a cohesive Indian elite. Throughout the second half of the
nineteenth century,military threats and famine relief necessitated state involvement
and also required expertise to administer and value the commercial elements of the
networks.
V. Argentina
In Argentina in 1869, certain dominant individuals underpinned the high degree
of network density, but the whole network was dispersed compared to India, as the
lower average degree centrality indicates (table 3). Compared to Britain and India,
the Argentine network was smaller, and only a fraction of the system had been
built by 1869. Between 1861 and 1865 British entrepreneurs using British capital
organized several railway companies in Argentina, including the Central Argentine
73 S.C. on East India (P.P. 1878, CLXV), ev. Dickens, pp. 1–72; ibid., ev. Northbrook, p. 85.
74 The new Orders were established in 1861 and 1877 respectively; Notes and Queries, vol. s2-XII, no. 298, 14
Sept. 1861, p. 208; The Graphic, 24 Aug. 1878, p. 202.
75 Hunter, Life, p. 5.
76 Crawford was involved with the Delhi Umballa and Kalka Railway Company and the South Mahratta Railway
Company. Danvers held seven directorships in Indian railway companies in 1869 and two in 1895. Bradshaw’s,
1869 and 1895.
77 Dickens and Trevor, Companion of the Star of India (CSI); Williams, Knight Commander of the Indian
Empire.
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Railway (CAR) and the Buenos Aires and Great Southern Railway (BAGSR), with
financial support from the Bank of London and the River Plate (BLRP).78
Dominant individuals in the network of 1869 were politicians and financiers.
Politicians’ role legitimacy offered the necessary negotiating expertise to overcome
the objections of the Argentine political establishment.79 Dominant politicians
included Samuel Waterhouse MP, director of the Great Northern Railway
Company and the CAR. Waterhouse’s commercial interest in Argentina derived
from his Halifax-based family textile firms, Waterhouse & Co. and Rawson &
Saltmarshe, exporters to Latin America from the 1830s.80 The Heyworths, father
and son, both Lawrence, in 1869 were respectively directors of the CAR and the
BAGSR, and Edward Woods was consulting engineer for the CAR and Buenos
Ayres and Ensenada Port railways.81 Heyworth Senior, a Liverpool merchant with
substantial experience of Latin American trade, disposed of his overseas interests in
1836 to concentrate on railways and a political career, becoming an MP in 1848.82
Given the small scale and low centrality of the network, involvement with the
CAR was the strongest predictor of broader influence. Direct interlocks were rare,
andWoods and the Heyworths were influential as intermediaries between disparate
clusters. Like the Heyworths, Thomas Duguid, another significant director of the
CAR, owed his position to the earlier activities of a family mercantile business,
Duguid, Holland & Co. and dealings with Barings, whose influence in Argentina
was increasing significantly.83 Heyworth Junior and Duguid used their inherited
expertise and contacts in trading networks to exploit the opportunities offered by
the interior and well-connected cities via the CAR.84 Barings meanwhile financed
national and state governments and provided loans for the railway network. David
Trail Robertson, MP and chairman of the BAGSR, also a director of Barings,
supported prominent financier Norberto de la Riestra, who facilitated negotiations
between British merchants and the Argentine government.85
Politician directors’ role legitimacy was underpinned by legal expertise.The large
majority of Argentine railway director MPs had legal backgrounds. These MPs
also offered connections to other relevant expertise (consulting engineers) and
to merchant banks. British experts influenced Argentina’s land laws following the
Rosas period (1829–52), which created concentrated landholdings by Presidential
decree.86 The CAR was effectively run from London but attracted local investment
through an associated company, the Central Argentine Land Company, run for
the benefit of resident British landowners. To assist them, local boards shadowed
78 Bradshaw’s, 1869.
79 Ferns, ‘Investment and trade’.
80 Llorca-Jaña, British textile trade, pp. 120–1.
81 Bradshaw’s, 1869, pp. 406–7. Later volumes of Bradshaw’s show that Heyworth junior succeeded his father as
director of the CAR until his death in 1903. Woods was also involved in the Andino Railway and Northern line;
Chrimes, ‘Civil engineers’, p. 688.
82 Heyworth retired as an MP in 1857, but continued political campaigns into the 1860s; Newbigging, Forest of
Rossendale, pp. 245–8; Webb,My apprenticeship.
83 Reber, British mercantile houses, p. 108; Barings Archive, London, House Correspondence Buenos Aires,
HC4/4.1.4, letters from T. Duguid, 1827–30.
84 Individual degree centrality measures of the individuals referred to wereWaterhouse: 15,Woods: 23,Heyworth
snr: 8, Heyworth junior: 16, and Duguid: 15.
85 Rock, British, p. 118.
86 Weaver, Great land rush.
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London boards to resolve disputes with governments.87 A significant investment
group centred on Walter Morrison, an MP and director of CAR, whose board
featured three lawyers, the River Plate Trust, Loan, and Agency Company
(RPTLAC), the Mercantile Bank of the River Plate, and the law firm of Ashurst,
Morris and Crisp. Between 1882 and 1888, the RPTLAC acquired managing
agencies for the East Argentine, Central Cordoba, and Rosario and Cordoba
Railways, and was involved in renegotiating provincial Argentine debts after the
Barings crisis.88
By 1895, these individuals and relationships were complemented by new
networks of influence. Table 4 shows that the dominant groups were now financiers
and politicians and that lawyers, reflecting their continuing influence in Morrison’s
group, were now the most influential non-elite group. Financiers were dominant
in numerical terms and by influence as measured by the group exchange score.
Although more numerous than politicians, aristocrats had a lower score, indicating
that they tended to sit on single boards rather than holding multiple directorships.
Dominant individual financiers exemplified the characteristics of the 1895
network. Gabriel Goldney, director of Capital and Counties Bank, along with
Edward Norman of Martins, were directors of Bahia Blanca and North Western
and Villa Maria and Rufino (VMR) railways. Norman and his colleague and
chairman of the same bank, Edward B. Merriman, were directors of the Cordoba
Central Buenos Ayres Extension Railway Company.89 Norman’s father, George
Warde Norman, was a partner with Barings and director of the Bank of England.
Goldney served as director of two Argentine railway companies included in the
sample and several other railway firms besides.90 He had an aristocratic background
and served as an MP until 1885. He was also a banker with a record of pernicious
lending practices,91 which was his principal role in 1895. He was involved with the
Bahia Blanca and North Eastern Railway Company, floated in 1891 in the wake
of the Barings crisis, and the VMR, based on profit guarantees from the Argentine
government, which it subsequently failed to honour.92
A further important network was led by innovator and financier George
Wilkinson Drabble and the banking firm Morton Rose. Drabble was chairman of
the BLRP, the Buenos Ayres and Rosario Railway, the BAGSR, and the Buenos
Ayres Western Railway (BAWR), plus several railways in Uruguay.93 He was also
the first British merchant to capitalize on the invention of meat refrigeration export
from Argentina.94 Morton Rose was established by Levi Parsons Morton in 1863
and Sir John Rose, a lawyer and colonial administrator who had served as anMP in
the Canadian Parliament and as solicitor general of Canada and Minister of Public
Works. On his return to England in 1869, he became a partner in Morton Rose and
87 Lewis, ‘Britain’, pp. 109–10.
88 Jones, ‘Great capitalists’, pp. 159–60.
89 Betweenness scores for these individuals were Goldney: 337.70, Norman: 337.70, and Merriman: 104.81.
90 Goldney’s obituary lists his directorships: Bahia Blanca and North Western Railway, Buenos Ayres and Pacific
Railway, Capital and Counties Bank, the Cordova Central Railway, the London Life Association, and the VMR;
Financial Times, 10 May 1900, p. 5.
91 Grossman and Imai, ‘Taking the lord’s name’, p. 86.
92 Lewis, ‘Britain’, pp. 118–20; ‘It was not a cheerful tale’, Financial Times, 11 June 1895.
93 Cassis, City bankers, p. 169.
94 Švepeš, ‘Ways’, p. 78.
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later the London and Westminster Bank.95 Morton Rose had an active investment
interest in the Transandine Railway, the BAWR, and the Cordova and North
Western Railway. Directors of the first two of these firms respectively included
financiers O. C. Waterfield (Transandine) of the Imperial and Ottoman Bank, and
Rose and Drabble (BAWR).
In summary, from 1870 onwards, there were three significant investment groups:
first, the Morrison and Morris group centred on the RPTLAC and Ashurst &
Co.; second, a group of investment bankers based around Goldney and Norman;
and third, the Morton Rose group based around Drabble and Waterfield and
associated investment banks. There were significant crossovers between these
groups, within a larger network dominated by financiers and politicians. The
Argentine case shows that MPs, typically lawyers by background, 96 as railway
company directors, provided experience with negotiating concessions from the
Argentine political establishment and navigating extension bills through the British
Parliament. Politicians and financiers therefore respectively provided the role and
resource legitimacy required to secure the expansion of the rail network.
VI. Conclusions
Comparing the evidence across the three networks suggests local circumstances
dictated substantially different reasons for the inclusion of elite directors on the
boards of London-quoted railway companies. British railways were developed
according to the priorities of regional industrial groups, whose members admitted
politicians to secure the relevant permissions or resolve battles over competing
lines. Hereditary aristocrats increasingly dominated their boards, supplemented by
early network developers who were promoted to the peerage alongside successful
industrialists.
In India, military control substantially explained board composition, which
reflected the power of civil servants, military engineers, and military commanders.
All three of these groups were promoted through the fledgling Indian aristocracy
in the later nineteenth century. British and Indian railways thus evolved aristocratic
boards, albeit for different reasons.
Outside the Empire, the Argentine case illustrates how groups based around
merchants coopted politicians, often with legal backgrounds, to negotiate access
and concessions. In this sense, the early phase of the Argentine network resembled
the British one. As the Argentine network developed, however, unlike in Britain
and India, financiers became increasingly dominant. Their emergence reflected
the transition of merchant houses into banks and financial houses organizing
investment groups, backed by politicians with legal backgrounds who could assist
in contractual negotiations with national and state governments.
In the face of this evidence, it is difficult to sustain the view that directors
were recruited at the initial public offering stage purely for reasons associated
with successful stock market flotations. Rather, board memberships reflected deep-
rooted and longer-run processes of engagement between railway companies and
95 ‘The death of Sir John Rose’, The Times, 27 Aug. 1888, p. 9.
96 Lawyers were alsomore prominent across other industries withMP directors: Braggion andMoore, ‘Economic
benefits’, tab. 2, p. 150, shows that lawyer was the most common background for MPs holding directorships.
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local institutions of control. The elite evolved into role and resource functions of
board membership and, in the case of the aristocracy, away from the premodern
functions based on reputation and trust.
Directors may have nonetheless performed the functions identified in the finance
literature, including accessing capital and signalling the quality of issues. It is
undoubtedly the case that directors with hereditary titles figured prominently on
the boards of UK firms and became more prominent towards the end of the
nineteenth century. If aristocrats were recruited for ornamental purposes, it was
more likely to be on the boards of British firms. In India aristocratic recruitment and
promotion reflected the role of railway infrastructure in the state-building process,
and aristocrats were relatively unimportant throughout in Argentina. Even in
Britain, however, it is noteworthy that hereditary peers were more closely associated
with smaller and older railways, which had relatively lower requirements for new
capital.
The patterns of board membership in the three jurisdictions considered here
offer general support for the role and resource functions of elite directors. In Britain,
India, and Argentina, the backgrounds of individuals, as industrialists, military
and civil servants, and as legal and financial experts respectively, had a substantial
impact on board composition. Through interlocks, they were able to access the
influence and the financial resources needed to develop further and sustain physical
railway infrastructure.
However, the evidence in this article is drawn from only railways and then in only
three contrasting geographical locations. More research could extend the analysis
beyond railways, or consider railways established elsewhere in this period that were
financed from London. Nevertheless, the contrasting functionalities of directors in
the three locations suggest organic reasons for the heterogeneous representation of
elites on London-quoted railway companies. For this crucial sector at least, British
expansion in the late nineteenth century, of the domestic industrial and commercial
base, of its strategic imperial interests, and of its overseas commercial interests, also
facilitated the expansion and co-existence of industrial,military, and financial elites.
DOI: 10.1111/ehr.13044
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